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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nicholas James Longee appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of
grand theft by possession of stolen property, unlawful possession of a firearm,
solicitation of grand theft by disposing of stolen property, and a persistent violator
enhancement.

Longee argues his judgment of conviction should be reversed

because the district court committed fundamental error in an instruction to the
jury, and because evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his persistent
violator charge.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In March 2012, five handguns were stolen from William Tharp's home in
Buhl, Idaho. (UPSI, p. 1; Trial Tr., p. 137, L. 9 - p. 138, L. 9; p. 139, L. 20 - p.
145, L. 14; p. 146, L. 20 - p. 147, L. 24.) A couple days after the burglary,
Nicholas James Longee phoned Kenneth Worth, who lived in the room next to
Longee's in their half-way house. (Trial Tr., p. 186, L. 22 - p. 187, L. 19; p. 188,
Ls. 16-24.)

Longee asked Worth for help selling five guns that were in a

pillowcase in a ditch out in the country. (Trial Tr., p. 189, L. 10 - p. 190, L. 6.)
Worth declined.

(Trial Tr., p. 189, L. 24 - p. 190, L. 2.) Longee then asked

Worth to take him to Omar Padilla's house, and Worth did. (Trial Tr., p. 191, Ls.
4-8.)
Longee knew Padilla because they had served time together in jail. (Trial
Tr., p., 216, Ls. 20-25.) Longee asked Padilla to take him to Filer to "pick up
some thumpers." (PSI, p. 13; Trial Tr., p. 217, L. 18- p. 218, L. 1; p. 221, Ls. 7-
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13.) Padilla believed "thumpers" referred to car stereo speakers. (Trial Tr., p.
222, Ls. 8-13.) Padilla's girlfriend, Ashtyn Jones, drove Longee and Padilla to
Filer in her car. (PSI, p. 13; Trial Tr., p. 218, Ls. 8-9; p. 221, Ls. 23-25; p. 223,
Ls. 3-4; p. 276, Ls. 7-20.) Longee gave driving directions; when Longee said to
stop the car, he got out and retrieved a pillowcase from a ditch. (Trial Tr., p. 223,
Ls. 4-24; p. 226, Ls. 17-24; p. 230, L. 23 - p. 231, L. 21; p. 277, Ls. 4-11; p. 280,

L. 25 - p. 281, L. 3.)
The three drove back to Twin Falls, and Longee said to go to the YMCA
so he could show Padilla the "thumpers." (Trial Tr., p. 230, Ls. 3-9.) At the
YMCA, Longee showed Padilla the contents of the pillowcase - five guns. (Trial
Tr., p. 230, L. 14 - p. 231, L. 1O; p. p. 281, L. 23 - p. 282, L. 5.) The guns were
the five that had been stolen from Tharp's home. (Trial Tr., p. 139, L. 20 - p.
145, L. 14; p. 231, Ls. 11-15.)

Jones heard Longee say "45 and 22" and

believed he was talking about guns. (Trial Tr., p. 230, L. 23 - p. 231, L. 4; p.
283, Ls. 2-11.) Longee then asked Padilla to sell four of the guns in exchange
for keeping the fifth. (Trial Tr., p. 232, Ls. 2-10.)
Padilla told Longee he agreed to the plan, fearing Longee's reaction if he
refused. (Trial Tr., p. 234, Ls. 1-7.) But after dropping Longee off, Padilla told
Jones he did not want to "get in trouble for having" the guns. (Trial Tr., p. 235,
Ls. 8-10.) Padilla talked to an off-duty police officer whose girlfriend he knew,
then led police to the guns. (Trial Tr., p. 237, L. 4 - p. 238, L. 6.) Over the next
day or two, Longee called Padilla a number of times about the guns, and
eventually, Padilla told Longee he had turned them in to police. (Trial Tr., p. 238,
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Ls. 15-25.) Longee told Padilla he had a week to give him $500, and instructed
Padilla to delete their communications from his cell phone, which Padilla did.
(Trial Tr., p. 239, Ls. 1-15.)
Longee, representing himself at trial, testified on his own behalf and told a
different story. (Trial Tr., p. 378, L. 10 - p. 385, L. 4.) According to Longee, he
called Worth for help buying a car stereo. (Trial Tr., p. 379, Ls. 21-25.) Worth
put Longee in touch with Padilla, who Longee happened to know from a rider
program. (Trial Tr., p. 380, Ls. 1-6.) Longee testified that Padilla said he had
car speakers for sale, but they would need to get them in Filer, and Padilla did
not want his girlfriend to know what they were doing. (Trial Tr., p. 380, L. 12 - p.
381, L. 4.)

Longee testified that Padilla told him where the speakers were;

Longee then explained that he knew the area because his mother lives in Filer,
therefore he gave Jones directions where to drive. (Trial Tr., p. 381, L. 21 - p.
382, L. 5.)
Longee grabbed the pillowcase out of the ditch, but testified he believed it
contained a speaker, not a box with guns in it.

(Trial Tr., p. 382, Ls. 12-20.)

According to Longee, they returned to town and were driving around in circles, so
he suggested they stop at the YMCA pool so he could look at the speakers.
(Trial Tr., p. 383, Ls. 5-19.) When Padilla opened the bag, Longee asserts he
expressed surprise, saying, "Oh crap. That's a .22. That's a .45." (Trial Tr., p.
384, Ls. 4-5.) Longee testified that Padilla asked him to hold on to the guns for
him, and Longee refused. (Trial Tr., p. 384, Ls. 11-15.) Longee then testified
that, even though he lived right across the street from the YMCA, Padilla insisted
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that Jones give Longee a ride home in her car. (Trial Tr., p. 384, L. 16 - p. 385,

L. 1.)
At trial, a jury found Longee guilty of grand theft by possession of stolen
property, unlawful possession of a firearm, solicitation of grand theft by disposing
of stolen property, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 258-61.) The
district court sentenced Longee to a term of twenty years with five years fixed on
count one, to run concurrently with five-year fixed terms on counts two and three.
(R. p. 294.) Longee timely appealed. (R., pp. 306-08.)
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ISSUES
Longee states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court commit fundamental error, in violation
of Mr. Longee's Fifth, Sixth, And Fourteenth Amendment
right to testify at trial, when it instructed the jury that he was
not a witness and that nothing he said was evidence?

2.

Must the persistent violator finding be vacated because it
was not supported by sufficient evidence?

(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Longee failed to establish the district court's jury instruction in
question amounted to fundamental error, in light of the record?

2.

Given Longee's admissions and certified copies of his convictions, did
substantial evidence establish the essential elements of Longee's
persistent violator charge at trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.

In Light Of The Record, Longee Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Jury
Instruction In Question Amounted To Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Longee argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury about what

was not evidence. Longee did not object to the alleged error at trial, but now
asserts the error violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Longee fails to satisfy his burden on appeal.
B.

Standard Of Review
Generally, issues must be raised before the trial court to be considered on

appeal.

State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). An

exception applies for unobjected-to error depriving a criminal defendant of due
process.

Id.; State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 820, 229 P.3d 1179, 1182

(2010). To establish such fundamental error, an appellant must demonstrate: (1)
violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error is clear and
obvious without need to further develop the record; and (3) that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings.
(2010).

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978

This three-prong test applies where the unobjected-to error concerns

jury instructions, as here. State v. Calver, _
(Ct. App. 2013).
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P.3d _, 2013 WL 2396726 at *5

C.

The Record And Instructions As A Whole Fail To Support A Clear
Violation Of A Constitutional Right
The disputed jury instruction addressed what is not evidence. Although

taken from the model jury instructions, the trial court modified it to reflect that
Longee was representing himself in lieu of an attorney:
Certain things you have heard and seen are not evidence,
including: . . . arguments and statements by lawyers, or in this
case, Mr. Longee. The lawyers and Mr. Longee are not witnesses.
What they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and
at other times is intended to help you interpret the evidence but is
not evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from the
way the lawyers or Mr. Longee have stated them, follow your
memory ...
(Trial Tr., p. 469, L. 21 - p. 470, L. 6; p. 476, L. 25 - p. 477, L. 5. 1) According to
Longee, this instruction violated his constitutional right to testify at trial.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-11.) Noting that he exercised this right, Longee argues
the court's instruction prohibited the jury from considering his testimony "for any
purpose other than 'to help interpret the evidence."' (Appellant's brief, p. 11.)
On review of jury instructions, the appellate courts consider "whether the
instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect
applicable law." State v. Skunkcap. 2013 WL 2714563 at *5 (Ct. App. 2013)
(citing State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App.
1993)). The reason for examining jury instructions as a whole is "because an
ambiguity in one instruction may be made clear by other instructions, and an
instruction that appears incomplete when viewed in isolation may fairly and
accurately reflect the law when read together with the remaining instructions."

See ICJI 202 (Determining Facts From The Evidence And Disregarding NonEvidence).
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Skunkcap, at *5 (citing State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,472, 272 P.3d 417,444
(2012)).
Longee highlights the trial court's ambiguous wording, "The lawyers and
Mr. Longee are not witnesses." (Appellant's brief, p. 9; Trial Tr., p. 469, Ls. 2425.) Longee also cites the instructions immediately before and after the disputed
instruction, which would bar consideration of Longee's testimony if Longee is
deemed strictly a non-witness. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) However, in arguing that
the instructions violated his rights, he astutely avoids examining the instructions
as a whole, instead interpreting isolated phrases without context.

Interpreting

the instructions as a whole, Longee is a non-witness in the same way that the
lawyers are non-witnesses.
The phrase "lawyers, or in this case,

Mr. Longee" provides the

instruction's context; it refers to Longee in his capacity as his own representative.
Thus, when acting as his own representative, Longee is not a witness.

(See

Trial Tr., p. 469, Ls. 24-25.) When acting as his own representative, Longee's
"opening statements, closing arguments and [statements] at other times" are not
evidence. (See Trial Tr., p. 470, Ls. 1-4.) "Other times" refers to questions of
other witnesses posed by Longee, as his own representative, or any other
statement by Longee when not testifying as a witness.
Indeed, Longee does not assert that he was prevented from exercising his
right to testify. Instead, he argues the instruction erroneously informed the jury
that "he was not a witness and that nothing he said was evidence." (Appellant's
brief, p. 11.) The record and trial transcript, viewed as a whole, support the
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correct and intended meaning of the trial court's instruction.

When Longee

testified, the trial court explained:
Ladies and gentlemen, it's very awkward for a person who
represents themselves to present testimony. So basically, ... Mr.
Longee is going to ask himself a question and then give an answer.
And the reason that we do that is so that Mr. Holloway can object if
he thinks that the questions are improper.
(Trial Tr., p. 378, Ls. 10-20.) The jury instruction thus informed the jury that
Longee's questions were not evidence, but his answers were.

In the state's

closing and rebuttal, the prosecution referred to Longee's testimony as evidence
supporting the state's case.

(Trial Tr., p. 499, Ls. 12-15; p. 500, Ls. 12-16; p.

513, Ls. 21-25.)
Ultimately, it is far from clear that the jurors erroneously understood the
instruction as a directive from the court to disregard Longee's testimony. For a
court to find that the jurors interpreted the instruction in this way, the record
would need to be developed further. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978).
Longee has not shown a clear error rising to the level of a constitutional violation,
thus he fails to establish the first two prongs under Perry.

D.

Longee Has Failed To Show That Error, If Any, Affected The Outcome Of
His Case
Longee also cannot meet his burden of showing the error affected the

outcome of his case. See State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106,113,266 P.3d 1211,
1218 (Ct. App. 2011). Longee's testimony, as summarized in the statement of
facts above, was arguably more damaging than helpful.
According to Longee, it was Padilla who led him out to the countryside,
despite that Longee admitted he gave the driving directions to Jones.
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(Trial Tr.,

p. 380, L. 12 - p. 381, L. 4; p. 381, L 21 - p. 382, L. 5.) Longee alleged that
Padilla had promised car speakers, but inexplicably, retrieved guns instead. (Id.)
Longee's testimony carefully accounted for all the various calls made, so as to
match the phone record he admitted into evidence. (Trial Tr., p. 365, L. 23; p.
380, Ls. 5-11, 20-23.) But ultimately, Longee's testimony was self-serving and
incredible, if not implausible.
Responding to Longee's attempts to discredit Padilla and Worth, the
prosecution acknowledged the witnesses' criminal histories, stating, "I told you
from the very beginning that this was a case that ... didn't involve choir boys or
boy scouts." (Trial Tr., p. 514, Ls. 14-17.) But Padilla had turned the guns in to
the police. (Trial Tr., p. 237, L. 4 - p. 238, L. 6.) As the prosecution noted, there
was no evidence of bad blood between Padilla and Longee, thus Longee failed
to establish a motive for Padilla to lie to get Longee in trouble. (Trial Tr., p. 514,
L. 21 - p. 515, L. 4.)

Testimonies by Jones, Padilla, and Worth were consistent with each
other, and consistent with the prosecution's theory of the case.
testimony was not.

Longee's

Longee has not shown that, absent the ambiguous jury

instruction, the jury would have returned a different verdict. Accordingly, Longee
has failed to establish fundamental error.
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II.
Given Longee's Admissions And Certified Copies Of His Convictions, Substantial
Evidence Established The Essential Elements Of Longee's Persistent Violator
Charge At Trial
A.

Introduction
Longee argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding

on his persistent violator charge.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-17.) According to

Longee, the only evidence to support his persistent violator enhancement was
certified copies of two burglary convictions. (Appellant's brief, p. 13; Trial Tr., p.
327, Ls. 1-17; p. 329, Ls. 4-6, 20-22.) Longee thus argues the enhancement
should be vacated. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-17.)

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of issues concerning the sufficiency of evidence is

limited in scope. State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 905, 994 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Ct.
App. 2000).

Judgment entered on a jury's verdict will not be disturbed where

there is substantial evidence to support a reasonable determination the state
established a crime's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

kt

(citations omitted). The appellate court considers the evidence in the light most
favorable to the state and will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury
regarding witness credibility, the weight given to testimony, or inferences drawn
from the evidence.

C.

kt

The Undisputed Evidence At Trial Established The Essential Elements Of
Longee's Persistent Violator Charge Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Idaho's persistent violator statute provides that "[a]ny person convicted for

the third time of the commission of a felony ... shall be considered a persistent
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violator of law .... " I.C. § 19-2514. The essential elements of the persistent
violator enhancement that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt,
were that Longee had two prior felony convictions. As Longee acknowledges,
the state introduced certified copies of his felony burglary convictions, which
were admitted at trial. (Appellant's brief, p. 13; State's exhibits 41, 42; Trial Tr.,
p. 327, Ls. 1-17; p. 329, Ls. 4-6, 20-22; p. 385, Ls. 13-25; see also PSI, pp. 27,
30.)

In addition, Longee admitted pleading guilty to the two prior felony

burglaries in his trial testimony. (Trial Tr., p. 418, L. 22 - p. 419, L. 6.) Thus
there was ample evidence on which a reasonable fact-finder could determine the
necessary elements for a persistent violator enhancement were met.
In arguing the finding should be vacated, Longee attempts to expand the
"essential elements" of a persistent violator enhancement under the court's ruling
in State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1986), and its
progeny. In Brandt, the court recognized a general rule that felony convictions
entered the same day, or charged in the same information, should count as a
single conviction for purposes of a persistent violator charge.
P.2d at 1014.

&

at 344, 715

"However, the nature of the convictions in any given situation

must be examined to make certain that the general rule is appropriate."

&

This

examination is necessary, the Brandt court reasoned, in light of the purpose of
the persistent violator statute - "to punish repeat offenders by making their
sentences for successive crimes more harsh."

&

The Brandt analysis - whether to treat prior felony convictions as one - is

conducted by the trial coutt. State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 568, 990 P.2d
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144, 149 (Ct. App. 1999).
determined by the jury.

It is not an essential element of the crime to be
The essential elements of the persistent violator

enhancement were supported by substantial evidence, thus there is no basis on
which to overturn Longee's judgment as to the enhancement. Because Longee
has raised no challenge to the district court's decision, as a matter of law, to
submit the persistent violator charge to the jury, he may not at this stage assert
it. See State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 338, 971 P .2d 1161, 1162 (Ct. App. 1998);
Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 877, 187 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm Longee's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 30th day of July, 2013.
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